Nuclear waste will remain dangerous for more than 100,000 years – so what are countries and producers doing to deal with this problem? Passing the buck, apparently: so far, not a single facility to safely store spent nuclear fuel has been created in Europe, or the world for that matter. Silvia Weko takes a look.
The dispose of nuclear waste in the Euopean Union is still not figured out (Public Domain)
Who is responsible for nuclear waste?
The issue of what to do with spent nuclear fuel has been on the table for more than forty years, but producers have yet to figure out a solution. The European Union stepped up after the Fukushima disaster: in 2011, the EU Nuclear Waste Directive declared that the producer is in fact responsible for its waste, which must be disposed of in the member state where it is produced.
For the first time in 2011, EU member states were urged to provide a plan for their radioactive waste disposal to the EU Commission, the goal of which was to encourage transparency and common standards throughout Europe. National plans were to be presented on August 23, 2015; the final reports were so badly prepared that the EU and Euratom were shocked, said MEP Rebecca Harms.
In fact, the EU could not come up with a sum of how many tons of radioactive waste existed on the continent – estimates range from 300,000 to 450,000 tons. This is partially because member states use their own national criteria when reporting, calling some waste “stored” or “disposed” when it is neither. In addition, some member states did not categorize materials that are radioactive as such (e.g. waste from uranium mining).
In addition, this process made clear that many European countries had no plans what they would do with radioactive waste and how to dispose of it. For example, the Czech Republic suggested using steel and granite repositories, which have been rejected as by Swedish experts. Overall, member states have made no progress on disposing of their radioactive waste safely. A 2017 report for the European Commission reveals that there are no disposal facilities for spent nuclear fuel operational in the EU, which is becoming problematic as the volume of waste increases. It cannot be understated how much of a security risk this presents for member states and Europe as a whole, given that radiation does not respect borders.
The European Commission has taken the lead by requiring that states present “adequate information” on their disposal plans every three years. But MEP Rebecca Harms seems pessimistic about decisions on final nuclear waste repositories being taken before the year 2075. She points out that the fundamental organization of waste disposal is still being discussed forty years later, even in “advanced” countries like Sweden and Switzerland.
The Swedish example
So let’s take a look at how an “advanced” country – Sweden – is dealing with radioactive waste. Its first research nuclear reactor was built in 1954, with commercial power plant operation beginning in the 1970s. And yet, there is still no final repository for spent fuel, simply because there’s realistically no technology that can keep such dangerous materials contained for more than 100,000 years.
Sweden follows the polluter-pays principle when it comes to nuclear waste: a fee per kWh of generated electricity is paid into the state-controlled Nuclear Waste Fund, which is responsible for managing and disposing of spent fuel. This fee is recalculated every 3 years and has been increasing fast (from around 0.4 to 0.6 €cent/kWh for 2018-2020). In addition, the Swedish nuclear industry is responsible for identifying sites and methods for final disposal of radioactive waste. The reactor operators have created a private company, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) to develop a method to safely dispose of spent nuclear fuel.
SKB’s proposed method for a final waste repository would use copper waste canisters and clay buffers, deposited in tunnels 500 meters underground in granite bedrock. However, experiments from the University of Stockholm have shown that the copper canisters corroded between 1,000 to 10,0000 times faster than SKB had initially estimated. The regulator has of course denied these findings, even though internal documents leaked to the media showing internal criticism of this stance.
Following this controversy, the Swedish Environmental Court recommended that the government deny the license permit unless the technological issue of copper corrosion was resolved. However, should the government decide to go ahead regardless, the community where nuclear waste would be stored has a possibility to veto the decision.
Determining repositories
The location of radioactive waste depositories is often a political and not technological decision, says Andrew Blowers. Blowers is a former Bedford, UK County Councilor who fought back when his community was proposed as a site for a radioactive waste dump, and has since examined how waste repositories are chosen in the UK and abroad. Waste is usually located in “peripheral” places, which are geographically remote and economically marginal; in addition, they are often politically powerless and already environmentally degraded, leading to a kind of cultural resignation and acceptance of nuclear waste.
These communities, like Hanford in the US or Sellafield in the UK, are exposed to environmental risks because they are already the “periphery,” while other communities refuse to accept nuclear waste. This leads to a pattern of spatial and intergenerational inequality.
So how should waste repositories be determined? The fairest and safest way is to look geographically for locations that have right geological conditions, as was the process in Sweden. Yet unlike the process in Germany to designate Gorleben as a waste facility, this process must be democratic and fair. It must happen quickly, as waste presents a real security risk for Europe as a whole.
Nuclear waste disposal is an incredibly complex issue, and one that producers must be forced to reckon with. If they cannot do so, which seems to be the case, then it’s yet another reason to stop using nuclear power altogether and transition to renewable energy.
Hello Silvia, I’d like to know if Finland is more “advanced” than Sweden in finding a final repository for spent nuke waste.
Regarding the Finland’s deep geological repository in Olkiluoto for long-lived radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel: the construction license was granted in 2015 and application for the operation license will be submitted in 2020. While the final disposal is scheduled to start in 2020’s. So the multi-barrier technological solution to contain long-lived radionuclides as long as they decay and become harmless to the environment is already existing. While this KBS-3 concept is for granite bedrock, technological solutions for clay formations are being developed as well.
The article seamed interesting at the beginning, but it lacks comprehensive overview at the end…
Hi there. Finland has determined a site and is testing the storage method. If the tests succeed, then they will get a permit. http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/WR-Full-scale-tests-to-start-soon-at-Finnish-repository-2006185.html
But this is the copper waste canister/clay buffer method which has been rejected by Sweden and the operator cannot prove it works. We will see.
Hi, Silvia. Thank you for replay.
Nevertheless, I do not fully agree. First, I think you are misusing the terminology. The storage (to be precise interim storage) method is already in place. Usually the SNF is stored in special casks (dry storage) or in pools (wet storage). While I think, the first option is far more better, both options are used in practice and completely safe. Yet it is not the final solution and the SNF has to be properly disposed. At the moment there is the international consensus that deep geological disposal is the best option to dispose the SNF safely until SNF will not cause any threat. At the moment, the Finland’s ONKALO project is the leading project in the world regarding DGR. The reference you provided just confirms that I already have said, that the construction license is already issued.
Your claim that KBS-3 concept (copper canister in crystalline rock) is not safe… It is the first time I hear about it. Could you please provide the reference to support this claim? To me it doesn’t make sense, because the Finish regulator already issued the construction license based on the research and analysis that proves that this disposal method works and is safe.
By the way, the clay (bentonite) has nothing to do with the copper canister. It is used to seal the canister disposal shafts.
Of course! It’s always good to get feedback. The article addresses specifically long-term storage, which may be where we are crossing wires.
In Sweden, the Swedish Environmental Court has said that the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company must provide evidence that the repository in the long term will correct the following uncertainties regarding how the protective capability of the canister may be affected by:
a. corrosion due to reactions in oxygen-free water
b. pit corrosion due to reaction with sulphide, including the contribution of the sauna
effect to pit corrosion
c. stress corrosion due to reaction with sulphide, including the contribution of the sauna
effect to stress corrosion
d. hydrogen embrittlement
e. radioactive radiation impact on pit corrosion, stress corrosion and hydrogen
embrittlement.
I do not speak Swedish so am relying on this information:
http://mkg.se/en/translation-into-english-of-the-swedish-environmental-court-s-opinion-on-the-final-repository-for-sp
http://www.mkg.se/uploads/Summary_opinion_Swedish_Environmental_Court_regarding_proposed_final_repository_spent_nuclear_fuel_Forsmark_Jan_23_2018_(unofficial_translation_MKG).pdf
If this information is provided, they can go ahead.
How does this compare with Finland?
your Finnish example is outlandish as no such technology has ever had a one, two, three hundred year or more test, never mind a thousand year. So engineers puff out their chests and say they have solutions which are never are truly tested in real world situations. Buildings, dams, and bridges continue to collapse. Nuclear facilities continue to have accidents. At best present solutions to nuclear waste storage is a crap shot.
Regarding the most advanced DGR site at Olkiluoto in Finland at which SNF canisters will be disposed: construction licence was granted in November 2015 and the operation licence application will be submitted in 2020 and the final disposal is scheduled to start in 2020’s.
At the beginning the article seemed to be interesting, but at the end it became greenish and not comprehensive.
Still I do not understand why green activists are against nuclear…
Hi, the operation license is dependent on a technology working which did not work in Sweden. Maybe they will learn from this failure and be able to do it successfully in Finland, but it’s a long shot.
The end of the article is meant to point out that the process of choosing where nuclear waste goes is also social not just technical. In a democracy communities have a right to say no. But then the question remains – where does it go?
Yes, I totally agree with you regarding the social aspect. Therefore the proper information and public (better to say all stakeholders) involvement from the early stages of implementation of DGR is crucial to project success. A lot of attempts to implement the final disposal solution of SNF have failed because of mistakes in this field.
Nothing will happen until there is a major and scary accident involving radioactive waste.
So Fukushima wasnt BADd ENOUGH
Is the UK still storing its Nuclear Waste in a disused Salt mine which is what I saw they were doing in a documentary basically stating they haven’t a clue what to do with it because they are no solutions of what to do with the waste?
I can no longer directly replay to Silvia comment…
Well, I thought half of the article was about repositories..
Thank you for the reference. Well I do not know all the history, but it is a little bit strange that the safety case is analysed by te court, but not the regulatory body. Nether the less it says that: “the environmental impact assessment meets the requirements of the Environmental Code and can therefore be approved” and “ the investigation meets the high standards set out in the Environmental Code ”. While it still has some concerns about “the safety of the canister”.
So that does it mean. The copper canister (while very important in this design) is not the only safety barrier that ensures that radionuclides will not be leached in to the surface. Multiple safety barriers system is used (an engineered barrier system (EBS) within a low permeability host rock that serves as a natural barrier). The court does not say that it corrodes quicker it says that the corrosion rate estimated by the SKB has high uncertainty. Therefore, it means that more research might be needed (in a, b, c, d, and e points) to reduce uncertainty (and support SKB claim) or other safety barriers improved to overcome higher uncertainty of coper canister corrosion rate.
There is a HUGE desert called the Sahara in which they could dig a HUGE hole to put all of the radioactive material in to and store it there until it is fully decayed. However the problem with radiation is it never truly decays. It has things call a half life. So once it reaches half life it will then have a new half life, and a new half life, followed by yet another half life. For example let’s say one type of radiation has 10 years so it’s half life would be 5. Once it reaches that 5 year mark then there is a new half life of 2.5, then 1.25, 0.75 and so on. but that is only ONE item.
Is it still possible to have an electronic chat with Silvia Weko regarding nuclear waste disposal please
I have some knowledge of this subject which may add to the information sharing pool
For time differences I am in Western Australia
Dear Peter please send us an email to energytransition@us.boell.org